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PROPERTY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The New Mexico appellate courts addressed various property issues
during the survey period.' The courts addressed some issues for the first
time in New Mexico, such as defining the parameters a legislative body
must work within when granting a zoning variance, 2 allowing a purchaser
of real estate 4to waive title defects, 3 and adopting the doctrine of afteracquired title.
Other cases deserve mention in this survey article because they clarified
and interpreted existing law. For instance, the courts discussed the en-6
5
forceability of private restrictive covenants, the law governing easements,
and the merger of property and contract in the landlord-tenant relationship .7
II.

CONTROLS OF LAND USE

A.

Public Controls of Land Use - Zoning and Planning
Zoning is a method of controlling land use which local legislative bodies
employ to ensure that land use does not adversely affect the public's
health, safety and welfare.8 Zoning is the territorial division of land on
the basis of suitability for particular uses and uniformity of use within
a division.9 For example, a municipality might zone a district for residential
use or commercial use only. A property owner who is unhappy with the
particular zoning designation of her property may seek a variance from
the public body which enacted the zoning ordinance allowing her to use
the property for a purpose contrary to the zoning designation. 0 One
case during the survey period addressed for the first time in New Mexico
the parameters a legislative body must work within before granting a
property owner a variance from a zoning designation.

1. This survey covers cases decided during the period beginning August 1, 1989 and ending
July 31, 1990.
2. See infra notes 8-51 and accompanying text.

3. See infra notes 141-64 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 165-89 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 52-102 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 103-40 and accompanying text.
8. Chilili Coop. Ass'n v. Sundance Mountain Ranches, Inc., 107 N.M. 192, 754 P.2d 1121
(Ct. App. 1988).
9. See Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 118 A.2d 824 (1955).
10. Downtown Neighborhoods Ass'n v. City of Albuquerque, 109 N.M. 186, 189, 783 P.2d 962,
965 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REL PROPERTY 872.2 (1988)). In addition
to seeking a variance, the property owner may also challenge the constitutionality of a zoning
ordinance in court or lobby the local legislative body to have the ordinance changed. d.
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In Downtown Neighborhoods Association v. City of Albuquerque, 1

the Whitehouse Partnership ("Whitehouse") purchased a historic house
near downtown Albuquerque. 12 The Whitehouse partners used the entire
first floor of the house for law offices. 3 The City of Albuquerque ("City")
cited Whitehouse for violating the existing zoning ordinance.' 4 The existing
zoning at the time Whitehouse purchased the house permitted only incidental non-residential use of property on less than ten percent of the
entire floor space of the structure. 5

Whitehouse sought a variance from the City Zoning Hearing Examiner
("Examiner"). 16 After a hearing, the Examiner denied Whitehouse's request for a variance. The denial was based on Whitehouse's failure to
show "sufficient unnecessary hardship" or "practical difficulty." 7 Whitehouse appealed the Examiner's decision to the Environmental Planning

Commission ("EPC").18 The EPC, after conducting its own hearing,
reversed the Examiner's decision and granted Whitehouse the variance. 9
The Downtown Neighborhoods Association ("DNA") appealed the EPC's
grant of a variance to Whitehouse to the City Council.20 After a rec-

ommendation by the Land Use Planning and Zoning Committee that the
case be heard by the full City Council, the City Council denied the
appeal, thereby affirming the EPC's decision to grant the variance. 2'

The DNA appealed to the district court. 22 On writ of certiorari, the

district court reversed the City Council, concluding that the EPC's grant

11. 109 N.M. 186, 783 P.2d 962 (Ct. App. 1989).
12. Id. at 187-88, 783 P.2d at 963-64.
13. Id. at 188, 783 P.2d at 964.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Pursuant to Albuquerque City Ordinance § 7-14-42, the City Council may authorize a
variance if the property owner seeking a variance shows in part that the present zoning creates
both "unnecessary hardship" and "practical difficulty." ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. ORrINANCES § 7-1442 (1986). For purposes of the ordinance, "practical difficulty" and "unnecessary hardship" arise
if:
(1) The parcel is exceptional as compared with other land in the vicinity subject
to the same regulations by reason of the physical characteristics of the land, which
physical characteristics existed at the time of the adoption of the regulation or were
created by natural forces or by governmental action for which no compensation
was paid;
(2) The parcel is exceptional as compared with other land in the vicinity subject
to the same regulations by reason of the conditions or use of the parcel or other
land in the vicinity which condition or use existed at the time of adoption of the
regulations; or
(3) The parcel is irregular, unusually narrow or shallow in share and the conditions
existed at the time of the adoption of the regulation or was [sic] created by natural
forces or governmental action for which no compensation was paid.
Id. § 7-14-42(C).
18. Downtown, 109 N.M. at 188, 783 P.2d at 964.
19. Id.
20. Id. The DNA had standing to appeal the variance to the City Council pursuant to N.M.
STAT.

ANN.

§ 3-21-8(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1985).

21. Downtown, 109 N.M. at 188, 783 P.2d at 964.
22. Id.
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of the variance was illegal, arbitrary and capricious.23 The court of appeals

affirmed the district court and remanded the case to the City Council
for further proceedings. 24
The court of appeals held that before the City Council may grant a
variance, it must require the applicant requesting a variance to show
"unnecessary hardship" in accordance with the City's variance ordinance. 25 In addition, the court of appeals made clear the City Council
26
must resolve several factual questions before granting any variance.
First, the property must be different from other property subject to the

same zoning restrictions. 27 Second, as a result of this difference, the
zoning must create "hardship" for the property owner.28 Finally, if the
City Council finds that a property owner is unable to make a reasonable
29
return, it must consider whether the particular variance is appropriate.

Specifically, the variance must be consistent with the public interest.30
Drawing upon case law from other jurisdictions, the court further held

that the owner's receipt of greater profit with the variance cannot by

itself justify the granting of a variance. 3' The court reasoned that although
the showing of unnecessary hardship varies from case to case, unnecessary
hardship ordinarily refers to situations where a property owner cannot

make reasonable use of his land.32 Thus, the court of appeals narrowed
the Albuquerque city ordinance definition of "unnecessary hardship" and
provided courts and local legislative bodies with more definite criteria

for granting a variance from zoning regulations.
Similar to the zoning powers granted to the City of Albuquerque, the
Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque ("Village") also has the power
to enact zoning ordinances. In Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque

v. Shiveley,33 the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the

Village had standing to enforce Declarations of Restrictions pursuant to
4
its zoning power
James and Patsy Shiveley presented the Village Board of Trustees with
a subdivision plan that included a plat of the subdivision and a Declaration

23. Id.
24. Id. at 192, 783 P.2d at 968.
25. Id. at 190, 783 P.2d at 966. See supra note 17 for the ordinance language that explains
when the City Council may find "unnecessary hardship" to exist.
26. Downtown, 109 N.M. at 190, 783 P.2d at 966.
27. Id.
28. Id. The court of appeals reasoned that the appropriate test for the existence of hardship is
whether, because of the difference, the owner will be deprived of a reasonable return on his property
if he is forced to use the property in compliance with the zoning restrictions. Id. (citing 6 R.
POWELL, supra note 10, at I 872.2(lbo).
29. Id. at 191, 783 P.2d at 967.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Stice v. Gribben-Allen Motors, Inc., 216 Kan. 744, 534 P.2d 1267 (1975)).
33. 110 N.M. 15, 791 P.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 704 (1990).
34. Id. at 16, 791 P.2d at 467. The court of appeals also addressed the issue of whether the
Village's enforcement of the Restrictions created an improper restraint upon the free alienation of
land.
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of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions ("Declarations"). 5 The plat
drawing consisted of seven quarter-acre lots, with each homeowner sharing
an interest in a five-acre common area.16 The Shiveleys included the
common area interest so that the subdivision would comply with the
Village's density requirement of no more than one house per acre.37 The
Shiveleys later amended the Declarations without Village approval.38 The
amended Declarations provided for homeowners to have common easements in a "leased common area" rather than an actual ownership interest
in the common area.3 9 The Shiveleys admitted in their depositions that
they never sold any interest in the common area, but rather deeded only
quarter-acre lots. 40
The Village brought suit in district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the Shiveleys. 4 1 The Village asked the court to
enjoin the Shiveleys from selling or leasing any portion of the common
area and to declare the amended Declarations null and void.4 2 The district
court dismissed the suit without prejudice on the ground that the Village
had no standing to enforce private restrictions .4 The Village appealed.
The court of appeals first addressed the issue of whether the Village
had standing to bring suit."4 In holding that the Village had standing,
the court of appeals made clear the Village was a zoning authority and
as such possessed the power to enforce its zoning regulations.4 5
The court next addressed the question of whether the original Declarations fell within the enforcement power of the Village by virtue of
the Declarations' similarity to zoning ordinances." Relying on Oregon
case law, the court of appeals held that the Village may enforce Declarations "in the same manner and by the same authority" as the Village
may enforce zoning ordinances as long as the Declarations affect the
public's health, safety, and welfare.4 7 Although the trial court found that
the Declarations were actually restrictive covenants and therefore the
Village had no standing to enforce them, 48 the court of appeals found
that the Declarations were more than private restrictive covenants. 49 The

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.at 17, 791 P.2d at 468.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 18, 791 P.2d at 469.
45. Id. The court relied on the language in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1985) to
support the proposition that the Village had standing to enforce its zoning regulations.
46. Los Ranchos, 110 N.M. at 19, 791 P.2d at 470.
47. Id. (citing Sayler v. City of Durham, 63 Or. App. 327, 663 P.2d 803 (1983)).
48. Id. The Shiveleys relied on the rule set forth in Singleterry v. City of Albuquerque, 96
N.M. 468, 632 P.2d 345 (1981). Singleterry held that only private parties have the right to enforce
private restrictive covenants. Id. at 470-71, 632 P.2d at 347-48.
49. Los Ranchos, 110 N.M. at 20, 791 P.2d at 471. The court further held that the enforcement
of the original Declarations was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation because the Declarations
control the use of property, rather than restricting the property's transferability. Id. at 21, 791 P.2d
at 472.
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Shiveleys maintained this position on appeal. Specifically, the Declarations

contained conditions of Village approval of the subdivision and in effect
re-zoned the area within the subdivision.50 Moreover, one of the goals
of zoning, orderly community development, was furthered by allowing
the Village to enforce the subdivision plans it approved.51
B.

Private Controls of Land Use
One common type of private land use control is an easement. An
easement is usually defined as a nonpossessory interest in the land of

another. 52 In New Mexico, the law of easements is not yet settled. Two

cases during the survey period, however, helped to clarify the law surrounding appurtenant easements and easements created by prescription
or by prior use, such as a public highway.
An appurtenant easement is assignable only if the dominant estate is

transferred along with the easement.5 An easement in gross, however,

creates a right that attaches to a person rather than to an estate.5 4 Thus,

an easement in gross benefits its owner regardless of whether the owner
possesses other land. 55 Under certain circumstances, an easement in gross
may be assignable because it is unattached to a dominant estate. 56 In
Luevano v. Group One and Group Five, 7 the court of appeals considered
some of the differences between appurtenant easements and easements
in gross.
Marilyn and John Luevano disputed with several adjoining landowners

about rights to a particular road easement. 8 The Los Poblanos Ranch
Road, which runs east and west, comprised the northern portion of the

Luevano's property. 59 The defendant, Group Five, owned property located
north of the Luevano property abutting the west end of the road easement.6°
Another defendant, Group One, owned three parcels of land abutting
the east end of the road easement and located east of the Luevano

50. Id. at 20, 791 P.2d at 471.
51. Id. The court further reasoned that orderly community development ensures well-planned
developments and protects buyers from nonperforming developers. Without allowing the Village
standing to sue, a developer easily could circumvent restrictions by first obtaining approval and
then failing to comply. Id.
52. J. BRUCE & J. ELY, THE LAw op EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND

1.01 (1988).

53. Kikta v. Hughes, 108 N.M. 61, 766 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1988). To be classified as an
appurtenant easement, the easement's grantor must have created the easement to benefit the owner
of a dominant estate. Id. at 63, 766 P.2d at 323. An appurtenant easement also requires that both
a dominant and a servient estate exist, one estate burdened by the easement, while the other benefits
from the easement's existence. Braat v. Aylett, 278 Or. 549, 564 P.2d 1030 (1977).
54. Brooks v. Tanner, 101 N.M. 203, 205, 680 P.2d 343, 345 (1984).
55. Winsten v. Prichard, 23 Wash. App. 428, 597 P.2d 415 (1979). In contrast to an appurtenant
easement, an easement in gross requires only the existence of a servient estate. See J. BRUCE & J.
ELY, supra note 52, at
201(3).
56. Courts generally differ as to what circumstances allow the transferability of easements in
gross. See 3 R. PowELL, supra note 10, at
419.
57. 108 N.M. 774, 779 P.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1989).
58. Id. at 775, 779 P.2d at 553.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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property. 6' When the Luevanos' predecessor in title owned the Luevano
property, he granted the road easement to Group One. The easement as
granted included all of Los Poblanos
Road, not just the portion that
62
abutted Group One's property.
The Luevanos built a fence blocking Group Five's rear access to their
property from Los Poblanos Ranch Road. 63 The Luevanos then filed a
quiet title suit in district court, seeking to quash the western portion of
the road easement." In response to the quiet title action, Group Five
sought and obtained from Group One an assignment of the road easement.
Based on its finding that the assignment of easement was valid, the trial
court granted summary judgment to Group Five in the Luevanos' quiet
title action. 66 The trial court further ordered the Luevanos to tear down
the fence.67 The Luevanos appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court. 6 The court of appeals
addressed the issue of whether the Los Poblanos Ranch Road easement
was assignable. 69 The court reasoned that the easement's assignability
depended on whether the easement was an appurtenant easement or an
easement in gross. 70 The court held that the easement was appurtenant
and therefore could not be assigned without a concurrent transfer of the
dominant estate. 71 Because Group One only assigned the easement to
Group Five and did not transfer property benefitted by the easement
(property
owned by Group Five), the assignment was invalid as a matter
72
of law.
The court considered two factors in holding that the road easement
was an appurtenant easement and therefore not transferable without
transferring the land to which the easement was attached. 73 First, the
court clarified that in New Mexico an easement is presumed appurtenant
unless clear contrary evidence exists.7 4 Second, the court enunciated policy
reasons for presuming that an easement is appurtenant rather than in
gross. For example, an easement that is not clearly in gross, if construed
as in gross, might allow assignment of that easement to strangers who
have no relationship to the surrounding property.75 Such an assignment,

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 775-76, 779 P.2d at 553-54.
Id.
Id. at 778, 779 P.2d at 556.
Id. at 776, 779 P.2d at 554.

70. Id.
71. Id. at 775-76, 779 P.2d at 553-54; see Kikta v. Hughes, 108 N.M. 61, 766 P.2d 321 (Ct.

App. 1988).
72. Luevano, 108 N.M. at 778, 779 P.2d at 556.
73. Id. at 777-78, 779 P.2d at 555-56.
74. Id. at 777, 779 P.2d at 555. In addition to law from other jurisdictions favoring the
presumption for appurtenant easements, the court cited Brooks v. Tanner, 101 N.M. 203, 680 P.2d
343 (1984) in support of the presumption.
75. Luevano, 108 N.M. at 778, 779 P.2d at 556.
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in the court's opinion, could unduly burden land
beyond the burden
76
intended by the original grantor of the easement.
The court was not persuaded by the defendants' argument that the
'77
original grant of the right-of-way used the words "heirs and assigns."
The court reasoned that such words were traditionally used to create an
estate in land. Moreover, the grantor's use of such words may signify
that the grantor intended the easement to be tied to land and therefore
appurtenant. 78
The Luevano decision clarified the holdings of Kikta v. Hughes79 and
Brooks v. Tanner.s0 In New Mexico, appurtenant easements may not be
assigned or transferred without the transfer of the dominant estate. In
addition, an easement is presumed to be an appurtenant easement unless
clear evidence to the contrary exists.
The law will recognize easements that arise from the adverse use of
another's land.8 ' A prescriptive easement, an easement by estoppel and
an easement by creation of a public highway all arise from adverse use
of another's land.8 2 One case during the survey period addressed the
elements of all three types of adverse use easements.
In Luchetti v. Bandler,a3 Phyllis Luchetti filed suit in district court to
enjoin Joanne Bandler from trespassing on her property. Both Luchetti
and Bandler owned property northeast of Tesuque, New Mexico. To
access her property, Bandler often made use of a dirt road that entered
United States Forest Land but continued and crossed Luchetti's property.4
Luchetti and her husband acquired the property in 1970 from the Forest
Service. A trail road branched off from the dirt road and led to Bandler's
house. 5 Luchetti, by filing suit, sought to enjoin Bandler from using the
trail road.8 6 The trial court enjoined Bandler from using the trail road
across Luchetti's land, finding that Bandler had legal access to her house
through two other easements. 87 Bandler appealed.
On appeal Bandler raised two issues. First, she argued that the road
in dispute was a public highway and therefore open to public use. 8
Second, Bandler argued that she had acquired an easement by either
estoppel or prescription.89 The court of appeals rejected both arguments
and affirmed the trial court's grant of injunction.
To support her position that the trail road was in fact a public highway,
Bandler relied upon a federal statute that granted a right-of-way "for
the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
108 N.M. 61, 766 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1988).
101 N.M. 203, 680 P.2d 343 (1984).
J. BRUCE & J. ELY, supra note 52, at 1 5.01.
Id.
108 N.M. 682, 777 P.2d 1326 (Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 683, 777 P.2d at 1327.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682, 777 P.2d at 1326.
Id. at 682-83, 777 P.2d at 1326-27.
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uses."' 9 Although two New Mexico cases have interpreted this federal

public highway statute, 9' the court of appeals apparently found little
guidance in these cases to assist the court in applying the statute to these

particular facts. 92 The court of appeals, therefore, turned
to various other
93
jurisdictions for assistance in interpreting the statute.

Drawing from several opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court, the
court of appeals reasoned that the test for whether a right-of-way is a
public highway within the meaning of the statute depends upon several
factors. The public's use of the highway "must be confined to a reasonably

definite and certain line."

94

The public's acceptance of the highway results

from people continuously using the highway. This continuous use by

others must be "necessary or convenient,"
96

95

but not a result of occasional

public use. Based upon the testimony at trial, the court of appeals
found the "trial court could have viewed the use as merely occasional

and not substantial."

97

The court of appeals concluded that Bandler failed

to meet her burden of proof establishing a public highway. 98
Bandler alternatively argued that Luchetti had knowledge or notice of
Bandler's use of the road and that Bandler, therefore, obtained an
easement by estoppel. 99 The court of appeals left open for another day
the issue of whether an easement by estoppel may arise under New Mexico

law.1 °° The court of appeals noted, based on the evidence at trial, that

the trial court could have found Bandler failed to establish one of the

90. Id. at 683, 777 P.2d at 1327 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1970)). This statute was repealed
in 1976. The public highway at issue in this case, therefore, would have had to have been established
sometime before 1976.
91. Id. (citing Lovelace v. Hightower, 50 N.M. 50, 168 P.2d 864 (1946); Wilson v. Williams,
43 N.M. 173, 87 P.2d 683 (1939)).
92. The court of appeals stated no disagreement with the earlier New Mexico opinions. The
court of appeals recognized that New Mexico courts have interpreted the statute as an offer from
the federal government to the public for the dedication of "any unreserved public lands for the
construction of highways." Id. According to the court of appeals, the criteria by which the public's
acceptance of this offer should be determined are by the "time, amount, and character of the
public use 'or any other evidence tending to prove or disprove acceptance."' Id. (quoting, Lovelace,
50 N.M. at 54, 168 P.2d at 867).
93. Id. at 683-84, 777 P.2d at 1327-28. The court of appeals relied predominantly on Colorado's
interpretation of the federal public highway statute, but also cited Utah, California and Idaho cases.
94. Id. at 683, 777 P.2d at 1327 (citing Sprague v. Stead, 56 Colo. 538, 139 P. 544 (1914)).
95. Id. at 683-84, 777 P.2d at 1327-28 (citing Leach v. Manhart, 102 Colo. 129, 77 P.2d 652
(1938); Uhl v. McEndaffer, 123 Colo. 69, 225 P.2d 839 (1950)).
96. Id. at 684, 777 P.2d at 1328. The court of appeals relied upon three cases for the proposition
that occasional use will not suffice. Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal. App. 2d 843, 849, 158 P.2d 207,
211 (1945) (where court found that "merely occasional" use will not satisfy acceptance of the offer
tendered by 42 U.S.C. § 932 (1970)); Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 119 P.2d 266 (1941); Hamerly
v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121 (Alaska 1961).
97. Luchetti, 108 N.M. at 684, 777 P.2d at 1328.
98. Id. at 685, 777 P.2d at 1329.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court of appeals stated that it would "assume but need not decide that under New
Mexico law an easement by estoppel may arise." No New Mexico case has yet specifically addressed
easement by estoppel. A person claiming an easement by estoppel must establish (1) misrepresentation
or fraudulent failure to speak on the part of the property owner over whose property the easement
arises and (2) reasonable detrimental reliance on the part of the easement user. See J. BRUCE &
J. ELY, supra note 52,
6.01 and cases cited therein.
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main elements of estoppel. Specifically, Bandler did not establish that
Luchetti's "knowing action or inaction" induced Bandler to act to Bandler's detriment.' 0' If easement by estoppel existed in New Mexico, Bandler
would not have satisfied the elements.102
In affirming the trial court's grant of injunction prohibiting Bandler
from using the trail road over Luchetti's property, the court of appeals
made clear that it will not easily acknowledge the creation or establishment of an easement by public use. Whether by use of the federal
public highway statute or by common law doctrines of prescription or
estoppel, a party in New Mexico seeking to create a public easement
must satisfy a heavy burden of proof.
III.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

Over time, the law of landlord-tenant relationships has changed from
a body of law distinctly set in the principles of property to a body of
law which straddles an undefined line between contract and property.' 3
In Navajo Academy, Inc. v. Navajo United Methodist Mission School,
Inc., the New Mexico Supreme Court reached a resolution to a landlordtenant dispute by employing principles of both property and contract,
along with law and equity.'04
The Navajo Tribe created Navajo Academy, Inc., a New Mexico
corporation ("Academy"), to operate a preparatory school for Navajo
youths interested in going to college.'0 5 In 1978, the Navajo United
Methodist Mission School, Inc., a New Mexico corporation ("Mission
School"), invited the Academy to move its campus from Ganado,
Arizona to Farmington, New Mexico and to share facilities with the
Mission School.106 The Mission School, in conjunction with the United
Methodist Church, also operated a boarding school for Navajo students. 0 7 The Women's Division of the Board of Global Ministries of

101. Luchetti, 108 N.M. at 685, 777 P.2d at 1329. In support of its finding, the court of appeals
cited a prior New Mexico case which establishes the elements of estoppel. See Young v. Seven Bar
Flying Service, Inc., 101 N.M. 545, 685 P.2d 953 (1984).
102. The court of appeals also rejected Bandler's argument that she had obtained an easement
by prescription. Obtaining an easement by prescription is similar to obtaining title to land by adverse
possession. See J. BRUCE & J. ELY, supra note 52, at 5.01. See also State ex rel. Baxter v. Egolf,
107 N.M. 315, 318, 757 P.2d 371, 374 (Ct. App. 1988) (where court noted that to establish an

easement by prescription, the public's use must be "open, uninterrupted, peaceable, notorious,
adverse, under a claim of right and continued for ten years with knowledge or imputed knowledge
of the owner"). The court of appeals rejected Bandler's argument and found that the "trial court
could properly determine that defendant failed to establish uninterrupted use of the trail road for
a period of ten years." Luchetti, 108 N.M. at 686, 777 P.2d at 1330.
103. Specifically, when a landlord leases property to a tenant, a landlord retains a reversionary
interest in the property and continues to hold the seisin (or title to the property) throughout the
248 (1991). The lease,
leasehold's duration. See 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
however, is a contract between the parties and, in most circumstances, its terms govern the relationship
221[4].
between the landlord and the tenant. Id. at
104. 109 N.M. 324, 785 P.2d 235 (1990).

105. Id. at 325, 785 P.2d at 236.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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the United Methodist Church ("Women's Division") owned the Farmington campus, which consisted of approximately 100 acres.108
At the time the Mission School invited the Academy, the Mission
School's enrollment was declining and the campus facilities were degenerating.10 9 Neither the Mission School nor the Academy put the terms
and conditions of the Academy's move in writing, although both parties
understood that the Academy could occupy as many classrooms and
dormitories as it required to operate its school."t 0 The Academy paid
no rent to the Mission School, with an understanding that the Academy
could utilize the Mission School campus as long as it provided a quality
education for Navajo students."' Four years after the Academy moved,
it occupied nearly all of the Mission School campus.'2
In 1982, the Mission School and the Academy agreed upon a course
of action to remedy the degenerating campus facilities." 3 The Academy
agreed to apply to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for money to renovate
the campus facilities."14 The Mission School agreed to support that
application with a commitment that the Academy would have use of
the campus for a long term." 5 The Mission School Board, in support
of its commitment, issued a resolution authorizing the development of
a long-term lease between the Mission School and the Academy with
an indefinite term of at least twenty-five years."16 The trial court found
the
that the Mission School Board's resolution created a promise.to
7
Academy to provide the Academy with a long-term lease."
The Mission School did not keep its promise to furnish the Academy
with a long-term lease." 8 From 1982 to 1987, the Academy and the
Mission School entered into a series of one-year subleases." 9 The trial
court found the subleases did not substitute or terminate the agreement
between the Academy and the Mission School regarding the Academy's

168. Id. at 325-26, 785 P.2d at 236-37. The Women's Division leased the campus to the Mission
School using a series of four-year leases which the Women's Division continually renewed.
109. Id. at 325, 785 P.2d at 236.
110. Id. The Academy's headmaster and the Mission School's superintendent reached this understanding.
11l. Id.
112. Id. at 326, 785 P.2d at 237. The Academy's growth and the Mission School's decline in
enrollment may be attributable to the fact that the Academy charged no tuition. Id. at 325, 785
P.2d at 236.
113. Id. at 326, 785 P.2d at 237.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The trial court found that the Mission School promised the long-term lease so that the
Bureau of Indian Affairs would provide money for renovation of the campus facilities over a multiyear period.
118. Id. The Women's Division apparently had an unyielding policy against leasing its property
for terms longer than four years. The Women's Division refused to accommodate either the Academy's
or the Mission School's requests for a change in that policy.
119. Id. For the year 1983-84, the Women's Division entered into a direct lease with the Academy.
None of the lease agreements required the Academy to pay rent. The consideration for the Academy's
use of the campus was its commitment to provide quality education to the Navajo students and
to maintain the facilities.
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long-term use of the campus.120 The trial court further found the Women's Division approved
of the relationship between the Academy and
121
the Mission School.
In 1987, the relationship between the Academy and the Mission School
began to languish. 122 Headed by a new superintendent, the Mission
School, in its 1987-88 sublease, demanded that the Academy pay rent
of $220,000. 123 The Mission School required the Academy to either sign
the sublease or vacate the campus. 124 When the Academy chose neither
option, the Mission School brought a forcible entry and detainer action
in magistrate court endeavoring to evict the Academy. 25 The Academy
then filed suit in district court seeking to prohibit the magistrate court
from hearing the Mission School's eviction action. 126 The Academy also
requested a declaratory judgment indicating that the Academy had a
constructive long-term lease which entitled it to extended use of the
campus. 27 The trial court awarded the Academy none of its requested
relief, but instead entered an order allowing the Academy to occupy
the campus for three years after the date of judgment. 128 The Mission
School and the Women's Division appealed.
The New Mexico Supreme Court concentrated its opinion on the
Mission School and Women's Division's claim that the trial court's
findings and conclusions conflicted with various principles of contract
law. 129 In particular, the Mission School and Women's Division claimed
the trial court's enforcement of their promise to give the Academy a
long-term lease violated the parol evidence rule, 130 the statute of frauds,' 3 '
120. Id.
121. Id. The Women's Division placed representatives with the Mission School, who acted with
apparent authority for the Women's Division, binding the Women's Division to the Mission School's
actions.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. The new superintendent and the Women's Division seemingly had decided to terminate
the relationship between the Mission School and the Academy.
125. Id. at 327, 785 P.2d at 238.
126. Id.
127. Id. The Academy also sought damages totalling $1,800,000 for the amount it expended in
improving the campus and compensatory and punitive damages for interference with contractual
relations.
128. Id.
129. Id. On appeal, appellants raised two additional issues. First, they argued the trial court's
findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Second, they argued the Academy breached
the agreement between the parties by repudiating the understanding that the educational program
would be a cooperative venture between the parties. According to appellants, the Academy's rejection
of this understanding constituted grounds for the Mission School's termination of the lease because
the understanding was an integral part of the parties' -agreement. The court rejected both arguments
fairly quickly, holding with regard to the first issue that the trial court's findings were supported
by substantial evidence. The court also rejected appellant's other argument, noting that the Mission
School breached its promise to provide a long-term lease. The Mission School's breach of agreement
was not affected by the Academy's subsequent repudiation of a cooperative effort between the
Mission School and the Academy in developing an educational program because the trial court
correctly found that the promise to provide a long-term lease was a unilateral contract. Id. at 32728, 785 P.2d at 238-39.
130. Id. at 327, 785 P.2d at 238. The appellants claimed the court should not have relied on
an oral agreement because it clearly conflicted with an unambiguous written agreement.
131. Id. The appellants claimed that an oral agreement creating a lease for more than three years
directly violates the statute of frauds.
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and the principles of a landlord-tenant relationship in a tenancy at
will. 132

The supreme court found that all of the appellants' arguments arose

from an incorrect understanding of the trial court's holding. 33 Specifically, the appellants erroneously believed that the trial court enforced
their promise to provide the Academy with a long-term lease. 3 4 The

supreme court concluded that the trial court did not enforce the promise,
but rather found that the tenancy between the parties was terminated.' 35
To reach an equitable result, the trial court allowed the Academy
to
36
use the campus for three years while it looked for a new home.
The supreme court found that none of the appellants' claims could

be substantiated. The court thus affirmed the trial court, but in so
doing explained how the trial court could rightfully grant equitable relief

not asked for by the parties.3 7 First, the court observed that when a
legal remedy does not provide the requesting party with justice, "equity

frequently interferes."'3 Second, the supreme court noted that the trial
court's invocation of equitable relief could only be reversed if the trial
court clearly abused its discretion. 13 9 The supreme court found that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the judgment of
the trial court allowing the Academy to remain on the Farmington

campus for three years.' 40
IV.

A.

TRANSFERS OF INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY

Waiver of Title Defects
During the survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed

the issue of whether a purchaser of real estate may waive title defects.

132. Id. A tenancy at will is a tenancy which has no stated duration and which may be terminated
at any time by either the landlord or the tenant. The trial court found a tenancy at will. Appellants
therefore claimed that they were entitled to terminate the tenancy and did so in 1987. Id.
133. Id. at 328, 785 P.2d at 239.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 329-30, 785 P.2d at 240-41.
138. Id. at 329, 785 P.2d at 240 (quoting Romero v. Muftos, I N.M. 314, 316 (1859)). The
supreme court related several lease situations where a court has invoked equitable relief. For instance,
in In re Weinberg's Estate, 177 Misc. 587, 31 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1941), the court permitted a year-toyear tenant to remain on the premises for six months after the lease's termination because the
tenant was too ill to be removed from the apartment. The Weinberg court further found that the
tenant was not liable for the remaining six months' rent because he was not a holdover tenant in
wrongful possession.
139. Navajo Academy, 109 N.M. at 330, 785 P.2d at 241. The trial court supported its equitable
order with several key factors, of which the supreme court took special notice. First, because the
Academy reasonably relied on the Mission School's promise to furnish a long-term lease, the
Academy refrained from finding another facility or seeking funds to build a new facility. Second,
the Academy spent a great deal of funds, which it obtained from the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
renovating the campus. The Women's Division accepted the renovation and improvements. Third,
the trial court found that if the Academy were evicted before it found another facility, its education
program would be destroyed, creating "a major setback for Navajo education." Id.
140. Id.
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In Lorentzen v. Sanchez, 4 ' Sanchez and Lorentzen entered into a real
estate contract in which Sanchez contracted to sell Lorentzen one half-

acre of unimproved property for $10,000.142 The parties used a real estate
contract form but added additional language which required Lorentzen,
as purchaser, to institute a quiet title suit within six months from the
date of the contract to quiet the title to the property.

43

The contract

title suit
further provided that if Lorentzen did not complete a quiet
144
within six months, he could elect to rescind the contract.

45
Lorentzen did not rescind the contract within the six month period.1

He filed suit to quiet title to the property eight days after close of the

agreed upon six-month period. 46 Third parties claimed fractional interests
in the property. 147 To clear the title, Lorentzen purchased the third parties'
interests. 1' Lorentzen obtained a judgment quieting title in his name.
The Sanchezes, after receiving an offer from Lorentzen to pay them
a token amount for a quitclaim deed to the property, moved the court

to set aside the judgment. 149 The trial court then entered an amended
judgment which stated that Lorentzen's title to the property was subject
to his real estate contract with the Sanchezes. 150

Lorentzen filed a complaint in district court in which he sought to

enjoin the Sanchezes from enforcing the real estate contract.' 5' He also

asked the court to modify the contract price and to have the Sanchezes
reimburse him $2,500 of the $5,000 he had already paid. 52 Finally, he
requested $20,000 in damages to compensate him for the purchase of
the third parties' interests. 5 a

141. 109 N.M. 693, 789 P.2d 1260 (1990).
142. Id. The contract specifically provided that Lorentzen make a down payment of $2,500 and
three annual payments of $2,500 at ten percent interest. As with most real estate contracts, a
warranty deed conveying the property from seller to purchaser was placed in escrow and was to
be recorded only when the purchaser paid off the real estate contract.
143. Id.
144. Id. Both parties initialed the additional language in the contract. The initialed portion of
the contract stated:
The purchaser agrees to commence and complete as soon as possible a suit to quiet
the title to the property herein conveyed at his own cost and the Escrow Agent
herein is hereby empowered to insert in the Warranty Deed after the wording "more
particularly described as" the full survey description approved in the Quiet Title
Decree. It being further provided, however, that in the event the Quiet Title Suit
is prevented from reaching its conclusion within six months hereof that the Purchaser
may instruct the Escrow Agent to deliver to the Seller the Special Warranty Deed
escrowed herewith, whereupon the Seller shall immediately pay $2,500.00 to Purchaser. Otherwise this contract shall remain in full force and effect.
Id.at 693-94, 789 P.2d at 1260-61.
145. Id. at 694, 789 P.2d at 1261.
146. Id. Lorentzen joined the Sanchezes as involuntary plaintiffs in the quiet title suit. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Lorentzen asserted that he spent $20,000 purchasing the third parties' interests in the
property. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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The trial court first granted the injunction, thereby prohibiting the
Sanchezes from enforcing the real estate contract."14 The trial court then
found that the Sanchezes only owned a twenty-five percent interest in
the property when they sold it to Lorentzen.' The court therefore held
that the Sanchezes breached their title warranty and that Lorentzen should
56
be required to pay only twenty-five percent of the purchase price.
Lorentzen also succeeded in his damage claim for purchase of the third
parties' interests in the property. 5 7 In support of its holding, the trial
court concluded Lorentzen was unaware the Sanchezes' property had any
particular title problems until after Lorentzen signed the contract. 58 The
Sanchezes appealed.
The supreme court found the dispositive issue in the case to be whether
Lorentzen agreed to assume the responsibility and costs for curing any
title defects affecting the property when he signed the real estate contract. 1 9 On appeal, Lorentzen claimed, as he did at trial, the Sanchezes
had breached the warranty deed covenants. ,60 The warranty deed covenants
were stated in the real estate contract form used by Lorentzen and the
6
Sanchezes.' '
The supreme court reversed the trial court and remanded the case,
holding that a buyer of real estate "may waive title defects by failing
to object to them at closing, when the contract provides the purchaser
with the option of waiving any title defects or rescinding the contract."' 6 2
The supreme court noted that the contract itself put Lorentzen on notice
the Sanchez property had title problems. 63 Lorentzen elected to quiet
title and therefore knowingly waived his right to rescind the contract.
When he waived his right to rescind the contract, he also waived his
right to challenge the status of the title conveyed.'" After Lorentzen, a
purchaser of real estate may waive title defects through terms in the real
estate contract in New Mexico.
The Doctrine of After-Acquired Title
The doctrine of after-acquired title' 65 is a common law doctrine under
which title to property conveyed by a grantor, who had either no interest
B.

154. Id. The trial court granted the injunction with the condition that Lorentzen deposit in escrow
payments due under the real estate contract. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The Sanchezes argued on appeal that the trial court's judgment was not supported by
substantial evidence. The supreme court noted that it must first decide the substantive contract issue
before reaching the issue of substantial evidence. Id.
160. Id. at 695, 789 P.2d at 1262.
161. Id. The court noted that when an inconsistency exists between a contract form and a provision
deliberately added by the parties, the added provision "must take precedence over that in the
contract form." Id.
162. Id. (citing Jones v. Dickens, 394 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1968)).
163. Id. The supreme court took notice of the fact that Lorentzen was a licensed real estate
broker, implying he should be, therefore, especially knowledgeable about matters of real estate.
Perhaps through this dicta the court was leaving itself some latitude regarding a "lay" purchaser's
ability to waive title defects.
164. I.
165. The doctrine of after-acquired title is sometimes referred to as estoppel by deed. The doctrine
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or defective interest in the property at the time of the conveyance,
automatically vests in the prior grantee when the grantor subsequently
receives title.'6 Courts of equity created the doctrine to enforce the
grantor's obligation to deliver good title to the grantee. 67 The New Mexico
Supreme Court directly addressed the application of the doctrine for the
first time in Hays v. King. 6
Hays filed a foreclosure action in district court attempting to foreclose
a mortgage on property he allegedly owned and attempted to sell to
King.' 69 The subject of the mortgage was a 7.033 acre tract of land
originally owned by the Gabaldons. 70 In 1968, the Gabaldons entered
into a real estate contract with Lanis Bosworth to convey a7 756 acre
tract of land which included the disputed 7.033 acre parcel.' '
The Gabaldon-Bosworth contract was not recorded until 1973.172 In
1977, Bosworth conveyed 10.688 acres to Petroleum Leasing Services,
Inc., evidenced by a recorded warranty deed.173 The 10.688 acres included
the disputed 7.033 acre tract. Petroleum Leasing conveyed the 10.688
acres to Ivy Heymann by quitclaim deed recorded in 1981.174 Heymann
conveyed the land to King by quitclaim deed. 75 King recorded the quitclaim deed in May 1985.176 A warranty deed from Gabaldon to Bosworth
77
was recorded in June 1985 in an effort to clear any title defects.
The trial court found that the only title defect in King's chain of title
was the incomplete Gabaldon-Bosworth contract. 7 1 When the warranty
deed from Gabaldon to Bosworth was recorded in 1985, King had clear
title to the property under the doctrine of after-acquired title. 79 Hays
claimed ownership of the property by virtue of a 1982 conveyance from
Bosworth to Franzen of the entire 756 acre parcel. Franzen then deeded
the 756 acre parcel to Hays in 1983.'10 The trial court found these
conveyances to be outside King's chain of title.' 8' The trial court further
found that Bosworth's conveyance to Franzen, with respect to the 10.688

of after-acquired title, however, is a subset of estoppel by deed. Estoppel by deed refers to a general
principle that a party to a deed cannot later assert any right against the representations in the deed.
See Trujillo v. CS Cattle Co., 109 N.M. 705, 710, 790 P.2d 502, 507 (1990).
166. Hays v. King, 109 N.M. 202, 204, 784 P.2d 21, 23 (1989).
167. Id.
168. 109 N.M. 202, 784 P.2d 21 (1989).
169. Id. at 203, 784 P.2d at 22.
170. Id. The court failed to make clear why King granted Hays a mortgage on the 7.033 acre
parcel of land. The court of appeals, in its opinion, deemed the issues surrounding the mortgage
and note secondary to and contingent upon the resolution of the dispositive issue: whether King
received good title under the doctrine of after-acquired title. Id. at 203-04, 784 P.2d at 22-23.
171. Id. at 203, 784 P.2d at 22.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 204, 784 P.2d at 23.
181. Id.
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acre tract, was meaningless because of Bosworth's prior conveyance of
that tract to Petroleum Leasing." 2 The district court thus dismissed Hays
complaint, voided the mortgage between King and Hays, and quieted
title to the 10.688 acre tract in King. Hays appealed.
Although Hays raised several issues on appeal, the supreme court
considered the dispositive issue to be whether the district court was correct
in applying the doctrine of after-acquired title. 83 In affirming the district
court, the supreme court stated that the doctrine of after-acquired title
applied to the entire Gabaldon-Bosworth chain of title and not just to
the Heymann-King conveyance.' 8 4 Specifically, when Bosworth granted a
warranty deed to Petroleum Leasing covering the 10.688 acre parcel, she
showed an intent to convey the parcel in fee simple." 5 Although Bosworth
received the fee simple estate after she already had conveyed it to Petroleum Leasing, Bosworth's conveyance in fee to Petroleum Leasing was
still valid.18 6 The after-acquired title inured to King as a subsequent
purchaser of the original grantee, Bosworth. s7 Because Bosworth had
already conveyed the 10.688 acre parcel to Petroleum Leasing, she could
not convey the parcel to Franzen.' s8 Franzen therefore could not convey
the 10.688 acre parcel to Hays. Hays in turn had no valid claim against
King because he had no interest in the disputed 7.033 acre parcel. 8 9
The doctrine of after-acquired title is now officially recognized in New
Mexico. Moreover, after Hays v. King, a purchaser who apparently claims
title under an original grantee may benefit from the doctrine even though
the purchaser received title via a quitclaim deed.
The present survey of issues and cases with respect to property law
in New Mexico has been provided to acquaint the reader with changes
in this area of the law. More specifically, this survey has articulated
court interpretations of legal issues relating to zoning and planning, private
land use control, landlord-tenant relations, and property transferences.
The substantive changes, as related throughout the text of this survey,
depict New Mexico property law for the period beginning in August 1989
and ending in July 1990.
ALISON 0. MAHR

182. Id.

183. Id. Hays argued that King should not benefit from the doctrine of after-acquired title because
King was a remote grantee in the Bosworth-Petroleum chain of title, because King knew of alleged
title defects at the time Heymann conveyed the land to King, and because King acquired title by
quitclaim deed. Id.
184. Id.

185. Id. at 205, 784 P.2d at 24.
186. Id. Upon completion of the Gabaldon-Bosworth contract, Bosworth would hold the property
in fee simple.
187. Id.

188. Id.
189. Id.

